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Introduction
In November 1981 the historian Nicholas Cope tracked down Tandayipi Absolom kaSolomon
Zulu to a bottle store outside Nongoma, Zululand. Once a contender for the royal throne
of the Zulus, Tandayipi was now an alcoholic who spent 'most of his days in the bottle
store.' But the ravages of liquor had not completely stripped the memory of those times
from Tandayipi's mind. 'I was displaced/ the old Zulu recalled of his abortive succession,
'If I was another chap... I had followers... I should have done a great mischief/ But the
mischief never happened. As Tandayipi admitted, 'I simply put my head down like a worm,
till now/ Almost forty years later he was still reluctant to talk, and steered the interview
onto other topics.2
The disputed succession to Solomon kaDinuzulu Zulu forms the subject of this paper. It is
a story with a fair share of drama, sex and violence. As the Chief Native Commissioner of
Natal remarked of the affair, 'The history of the Zulu Royal House is one long story of
intrigue/3 Yet the fascinating realm of Zulu politics Cbyzantine' was Shula Marks's
adjective) is only background to the story told here. The focus, rather, is on the dispute as
a window into the creation of a form of customary law ('native law') in Natal, and its
application by Native Commissioners and the 'native courts/4
The study of customary law has its origins in anthropological writings, often conceived as
guidebooks for colonial administrators. This straightforward approach was adopted by
lawyers who attempted to extricate and summarise the 'rules' belonging to different 'tribes/
a process that was continued after independence.5 The 1960s and 1970s saw a shift in focus
to the study of litigants, rather than on law's role in maintaining social order.6 Realisation
of the bounding power of rules, led to new directions of study. In South Africa, Raymond
Suttner built on the work of the French structuralists, in particular Louis Althusser, to argue
that 'it is one of the functions of the special system of civil law for Africans to constitute
Africans as specific tribal subjects/7 Suttner realised that his account of the creation of tribal
consciousness was somewhat top-heavy, adding the caveat, 'In responding to such
tendencies, it is important that one does not overreact and assume that customary law is a
Nationalist Party creation, and that it has no relevance at all/8
This tension was addressed by the writings of a new generation of legal anthropologists who
recognised that 'the law of the western state comes first in time, and customary law
afterwards,' but stressed that it was no mere colonial imposition.9 Rather, it had emerged
as a result of interaction between colonial administrations and the elites of African
communities. Not only was the creation of customary law a dialectic, but also its use,
observations which were firmly rooted in the jurisprudential tradition of EP Thompson.10
Native Law in Natal
British colonial governments in Africa, hampered by lack of resources, found themselves
facing a gargantuan administrative task. The solution lay in a policy of indirect rule—as
formulated by Lord Lugard and, in Natal, Sir Theophilus Shepstone—which included the
recognition of customary law. Settler societies were split by debates over the recognition and
codification of customary law. The dilemma facing colonial governments was summed up
by a contemporary lawyer who wrote, 'No Code can succeed in suddenly raising the whole
tone of a semi-savage people; and, on the other hand, no code will be of practical utility
unless it be acceptable in the main to the Natives themselves/11 The tension between
civilising and administering is a recurrent theme in the colonial enterprise, no less in Natal
than central Africa.
Following the annexation of Natal by the Cape in 1845, ordinance No. 12 of 1845 extended
Roman-Dutch law to the District of NataL Three years later Queen Victoria issued an order
preserving native laws, customs and usages not 'repugnant to the general principles of
humanity recognised throughout the civilised world/ which was embodied in Natal
Ordinance No. 3 of 1849.12 Shepstone's personal rule was interrupted after Langalibalele's
Hlubi were brutally punished for refusing to surrender their ancient rifles to the government.
The scandal prompted the colonial office to send Sir Gamet Wolseley to right matters,
including systematising the administration of native law.13 The Natal Code of Native Law
attempted to codify the system of native law then operative in the colony. Initiated in 1875,
it took three years for the board entrusted with the task of codification to produce the 1878
Natal Code of Native Law. Judge Chadwick, secretary to the board, later described how the
process of collecting reports from magistrates, administrators, old colonists and missionaries
produced 'voluminous answers/ especially on the question of inheritance:
The Chairman [Sir Henry Connor CJ] boiled down all these voluminous answers into the
few leading principles shown in the Code as it now stands. All that was said about
ancestral kraals, Isizinda, Hcanda, Isokangqangi, and Mnawe were swept away by him as
only calculated to trouble and confuse the Courts. He confined himself to declaring the
supremacy of the kraal head, who had complete control so long as he lived over all the
inmates of his kraal, and all the property of all the houses, but he gave a clear definition of
house property and simply declared that all property which was not house property was
kraal property.14
The distortions which resulted from this 'boiling down' led to general dissatisfaction with the
Code. The Attorney-General explained in 1884 that the Board had relied on the expertise of
its members and, 'Any absurdity that exists in the Code is therefore caused by the
information so obtained. The great difficulty the Board had to contend with in reducing the
Native Law to writing was to reconcile the conflicting opinions expressed by the skilled
members as to the various Native Law doctrines or canons/15 The Code was slightly
revised and repromulgated in 1891.16
There were some slight changes after Union, but the big shake-up came with the Native
Administration Act in 1927 (as amended by Act no. 9 of 1929), which removed the Natal
Native High Court's civil jurisdiction and established two Native Appeal Courts, appeals
from which were to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.17 The Act made
provision for Native Commissioner's Courts, which were defined as 'a court of law' and
appeal from which lay to the Native Appeal court.18 The Native Administration Act
overhauled not only the courts, but also laid the basis for a revision of the Natal Code by
means of section 24 which empowered the Governor-General to amend the Code by
proclamation. A new Code was duly proclaimed by Supreme Chief EG Jansen in 1932.19
Since its inception, the Natal Code had been criticised for its rigidity. In 1897 Natal Prime
Minister Binns, remarked, 'There was a certain amount of elasticity about Native Law before
you codified it, which made it extremely useful. But now we are bound hard and fast, and
tied to the four corners of the law.'20 This problem was exacerbated by social change, as one
Gumede had noted a few years before Binns when he wrote, 'Native laws were made by
men, who died many years ago. These men lived a quite different life from ours; and never
saw a streak of today life.'21 A similar view, based on the nature of customary law, is
expressed by legal academics Bennett and Vermeulen, that once customary law is codified,
it is no longer customary law, thus 'a code is necessarily antithetical to customary law.'3/22
Administrators such as Theophilus Shepstone feared that their powers would be curtailed
by a code; Shepstone himself was one of the Code's staunchest opponents. Natal Sheriff
Thomas Phipson commented that he had been told by magistrates that 'Kaffir Law... was
merely an euphemism for the arbitrary will of the chief, that is of the magistrate, checked
only by an appeal to Mr Shepstone, and altered by him in every case that I ever heard of for
the worse.'23 And the officials of the Native Affairs Department in the Rustenburg district
in the 1920s and 1930s recognised 'the "elasticity and flexibility" of customary law... as its
most valuable asset in controlling the rural African population.'24 Rigidity thus placed
constraints on both governor and governed.
It was however a rigidity that was open to manipulation. Roberts and Comaroff argue that
'norm and reality exist in a necessary dialectical relationship' in Tswana law,25 and a similar
point can be made with regard to native law. It will be argued that while white officials
were trying to ascertain customs in order to formulate 'rules/26 these very 'rules' were
deployed in creative ways by both African litigants and white adjudicators.
The Storv So Far
While the Supreme Chief legislated from on high, the king of the Zulus held court at
Nongoma. Although not recognised by the government as anything more than the chief of
the Usuthu, Solomon kaDinuzulu Zulu was popularly acknowledged as the heir to the great
Zulu kings. After failing to gain official recognition of his status, Solomon contented himself
with the joys of the material world. But alcohol was a poor companion and the king died
a bitter man in early 1933.27
Appointing an heir was no simple business, complicated by the fact that the late king's sons
were still minors. Solomon's only full brother, Mshiyeni kaDinuzulu Zulu was nominated
by the royal house and accepted by the government as regent. Compared to his dissolute
sibling, Mshiyeni was a joy to the local NAD. Natal Chief Native Commissioner Harry Lugg
was unstinting in his praise of the regent:
Mshiyeni is an agreeable person to meet: he is abstemious, particular about his appearance
and polished in manner. As a man and as a Chief, his conduct has hitherto been entirely
satisfactory. As to his domestic affairs, perhaps I may mention that he has only two wives,
as against his predecessor's forty-seven.28
Lugg successfully campaigned to have Mshiyeni's stipend increased, and eventually
supported the regent's elevation to 'Acting Paramount Chief in 1939, arguing 'It is necessary
that we should have a powerful weapon to counter the insidious propaganda which is being
disseminated amongst our urban Natives, and this can best be secured by strengthening our
tribal system in Natal.'29
It was Mshiyeni who soon thereafter requested that the initial choice of heir, one
Pikokwaziwayo, be replaced as he was an 'unsuitable' character. In his stead Tandayipi
would be the candidate. Lugg cautiously supported the regent, but insisted that the new heir
be chosen by a full meeting of the royal family and publicly announced.30
A meeting was held in April 1940 and it was reported to the CNC Natal that Tandayipi was
elected as Solomon's heir. This decision, so Lugg reported, 'has met with the whole-hearted
approval of all Chiefs and Natives of standing in this province/31 In an earlier private
communication to Secretary for Native Affairs Douglas Smit, Lugg had been more effusive:
'The announcement was received with a thunderous roar of Bayedes and without a single
dissenting voice. I know you will be greatly relieved to hear that this troublesome matter
has been so satisfyingly disposed of.'32
Any relief Smit may have enjoyed was shortlived. In July 1944, the CNC somewhat
resignedly informed his superior in Pretoria, 'You will be disappointed to leam that in spite
of all our efforts to avoid it... there is going to be a dispute in connection with the succession
to the late Chief Solomon/ The CNC promised to investigate, reassuring the SNA,
'Meanwhile do not worry unduly about this business. These people are merely acting in a
manner traditional to the Zulu ruling house/33
While these disingenuous comments may have pacified Douglas Smit, events back home
were causing a great deal of worry to the Nongoma Native Commissioner, Hjalmar Peder
Braatvedt. The son of Norwegian missionaries who bequeathed three sons to the civil
service, Braatvedt prided himself on his knowledge of 'native customs/ his Zulu name
'Mqangabodwe' (the tall one), and his 1935 De Luxe Dodge Sedan, which after 17 500 miles
on the treacherous Zululand roads was 'in perfect condition.'34 He was approaching his
fortieth year of service, having been recalled from retirement due to the war and was only
transferred to the Nongoma magistracy, the senior post in Zululand, in April 1943.35
Trouble was the last thing Mqangabodwe needed.
This desire to avoid conflict was not peculiar to Braatvedt. The maintenance of good order
was a departmental priority, and any deviation was a blow to the image of both the
department and the individual. Writing of Kenya, Bruce Berman has drawn attention to the
importance of 'prestige' in colonial administration: '"Prestige" was more than mere authority;
it was a question of mystique.... Where an officer failed to establish his personal authority,
he not only damaged the "prestige" of the Provincial Administration, but also suffered a
personal humiliation that could ruin his career.'36 Further south than his Kenyan colleagues,
Braatvedt was nonetheless a fine exemplar of this contention. If a challenger's claim were
ignored and a 'flare up ' resulted, he fretted, 'what would be the effect upon the Department,
The Government, not to mention the officials who had ignored the claim? I am sorry this
has happened while I am here and I am not looking forward to the work and worry which
this business will involve.... There are scores of "Native Administration Experts" (selfstyled)
who are waiting to heave stones at us.'37
Ultrasensitive to rumours of trouble, Braatvedt had informed the CNC as early as March
1944, that all was not well. 'It is freely discussed (in secret) that the rightful heir was
manoeuvred out of the position as heir,' he observed, *but that he will nevertheless, one day,
claim his property.'38 In May he told Harry Lugg that 'this is going to be a serious
business.' For the man who had hoped to 'jog along with the team in a slack harness during
the extra time [he was] "serving"/ events were taking a decidedly unpleasant turn.39
Tandayipi's half-brother, Cyprian Bekezulu kaSolomon Zulu, was the claimant responsible
for Mqangabodwe's distress. The young prince had been given a copy of a Zulu school
textbook by his mother, Christina Zulu (also known by her family name, okaMatatela) who
was Solomon's first wife. A seemingly innocuous primary school text by the Zulu writer
RRR Dhlomo, lzikhali zaNamuhla contained one explosive passage:
The king's heir, who is too young to rule, is named Cyprian. His regent is Prince Mshiyeni,
son of Dinuzulu who succeeds Solomon in age. The choice of Mshiyeni was agreed on by
all, even the government, so that he can rule until the heir grows up.40
It was these words, fixed on the page, which prompted Cyprian's challenge. Jeff Guy has
written of the spread of literacy, 'The Book becomes the repository of Knowledge, the
document establishes authority and precedent in a form independent of spatially restricted,
temporally transient, human physicality.'41 With his authority firmly in hand, Cyprian
approached Zazeni Ngema, one of Solomon's trusted officials, telling him that he had been
'nominated by books.'42 Cyprian arranged a meeting with the Regent to discuss his claim,
but Mshiyeni was unimpressed. The old man, so Cyprian later reported, had shouted, 'I
have a mind to shoot you immediately and then take to the forests having spilled blood.'
He also warned Cyprian that 'the Chieftainship of the Zulus was attained by bloodshed.'43
Ever the traditionalist, Mshiyeni fought against the disembodied authority to which Cyprian
appealed. 'Sir/ the regent wrote to his NC, 'it has angered us all that R.R.R. Dlomo should
enter to such an extent into Cetshwayo family when we do not know him even with eyes.'44
While the Nongoma NC was convinced of impending disaster, Pretoria was intent on
keeping the succession question closed, and insisted Mshiyeni call a meeting in an attempt
to reconcile the two factions. The meeting, unsurprisingly, was unhelpful, and served only
to deepen the antagonisms. Cyprian's supporters turned to government. On the morning
of Saturday 23 September, much to Braatvedt's irritation, Cyprian and over one hundred
others arrived at the NC's office. Amidst much talk of blood flowing, the government was
warned to act quickly. The meeting had the desired effect and the following day Braatvedt
wrote to the CNC, warning of an impending 'Civil War' if the matter were not resolved. He
urged that an enquiry be held, adding, 'Whatever the decision will be, the position is fraught
with grave dangers.'45 The odour of fear emanating from Nongoma was however not
enough to dispel the Departmental lethargy. It was another two months before Pretoria gave
the go ahead for an enquiry. The Board of Advisers appointed to clear up the matter
comprised Natal NAD stalwarts, men who 'knew the customs, language and minds of the
natives'—the acting Natal CNC, Colonel Benjamin Martin; Nongoma NC, HP Braatvedt; and
Pietermaritzburg NC Vivian Addison.46 With the composition of the Board settled, all that
remained was to select the heir.
Thus it was that the three officials appointed by the Governor-General found themselves in
Nongoma in February 1945. In the muggy heat that comes with summer in Zululand, they
set about their business of determining the heir to the Usuthu. For some eight days, spread
over three months, the Board would hear evidence regarding the disputed succession.
Witnesses would be called, recalled, cross-examined and generally interrogated by a variety
of persons in an exhaustive process that was supposed to determine the chief of the Usuthu.
On Wednesday morning, 7 February 1945, Colonel Martin, the Chairman of the Board,
opened the enquiry to cries of 'Nkosi!' Martin began by explaining the situation which had
arisen and the role of the Board: 'Our function is only that of advisers to the government....
The ultimate decision rests with the government—with the Supreme Chief of the country.'47
He implored those present to 'remain calm, cool and collected during this enquiry/ warning,
'Each member of this Board can claim to understand Zulu. We have made a study of Zulu
customs. It will be no good trying to bluff us. We want just the truth—nothing more.'48
The Truth and the Law
As Solomon had, by all accounts, chosen no chief wife, the dispute was to be governed under
section 104(4) of the Natal Code, which made provision for succession in the absence of a
chief wife:
it is the duty of the elders of the tribe to assemble and confer status upon the widows,
appointing the chief wife [of the great house or indlunkulu] and determining the ikohlo
[separate house in a homestead], the iqadi [house subordinate to the indlunkulu] and junior
houses or in other customary and lawful manner fixing the rank of each house.
Family law, under the Code, was particularly rigid, and organised in terms of the 'kraal
system.' Each wife of the Taaal head' belonged to her own 'house'; when there was more
than one house in the kraal it became necessary to define the relative importance of each
house.49
Under native law, explained Judge Jackson of the Native High Court, in a passage that was
cited with approval by the Appellate Division, there must always be an indlunkulu, or chief
house, in every kraal in order for succession by primogeniture. To secure the succession, the
kraal head may affiliate other houses to the indlunkulu or establish a supplementary great
house known as the iqadi which is an integral part of the kraal. He could also create an
ikohlo house, in order to circumvent the strict operation of the rule of primogeniture; this
house was regarded as a distinct and separate section of the kraal. The ikohlo heir had no
claim on the inheritance of the indlunkulu, except as a last resort, and vice-versa.50
A commoner's first wife was his chief wife (or indlunkulu wife), yet hereditary chiefs were
permitted to appoint their chief wife at any time.51 Section 104 of the Code related to chief
wives of hereditary chiefs, who, in terms of subsection one were 'usually taken later in life
than the first and second wives/ This was standard practice, Kerr avers, as a chief's first
wife would be one of his own choice, whereas the indlunkulu wife, 'who is rarely his first
wife, is chosen in consultation with the tribe.' The position of the first wife was safeguarded
by making her house the senior ikohlo house.52
This indeed appeared to be the position, as applied by the native courts. A seminal case,
with similar facts, was concerned with the succession to the late chief Teteleku of the
Mpumuza.53 The plaintiff claimed that his mother was virtually the chief wife and all that
remained to confirm this was a formal declaration of her status. Witnesses testified to a
number of factors which ostensibly indicated her superior position within the kraal. The
plaintiff also argued that 'every canon of native law on the subject had been violated by the
selection of the defendant, alleging that he was the son of the first wife—the
Sokanqangi—whose status is well defined, and whose son is incapable of rightly succeeding
his father.' Subsequent to the chief's death, 'the headmen of his family and of the tribe in
the vicinity of his kraal' set about selecting an heir, eventually settling upon the defendant.
The plaintiff averred that the meeting had excluded many of his supporters, yet the court
found it was called in good faith. The taking or elevation of a chief wife, Campbell JP held,
could not occur in secret but only with the support of the tribe. Reviewing the law on
succession, the learned Judge President stated that amongst chiefs the heir is born of the chief
wife, and his nomination is thus not personal to him but conferred by virtue of his mother's
status. The eldest son of the first wife never succeeded to the position of his father.54
Thus the court found that Teteleku had not appointed a chief wife and the nomination by
the family and leading tribal members was valid. In addition, and crucially, the defendant's
mother was not the late chief's first wife and the defendant was thus eligible to be chief.
This decision provides a clear statement of the law on succession which, in terms of the
doctrine of stare decisis, was binding on later courts and does not seem to have been dissented
from.55
The evidence relating to the practice of succession, outside the courts, is less clear and the
position is difficult to reconstruct, although it seems to follow the 'legal' one. The isoScanqangi,
by all accounts, did not succeed his father.56 Cetshwayo kaMpande Zulu confirmed that the
eldest son of the chief wife was the heir, who could not be bypassed by the father. In
response to the question, 'Can a man adopt as his heir anyone but the eldest son of his chief
wife if such son is living?', the king gave a simple 'No.'57
The Custom of Kings
With the position so clearly settled, in both law and custom, the only remaining argument
was that the royal house was sui generis, governed by special 'rules' which the Board
attempted to elicit from the witnesses. The irony of making exceptions for kings who were
not recognised by the Department, never struck the Advisers. The Chiefs of the Zulu Royal
House/ the Board found, 'being of hereditary status, are entitled to the privilege of assuming
a Chief or Tribal wife who is usually taken later in life than the first and second wives. It
transpired during this enquiry, however, that the Kings of the Zulus had never, as far as is
known, exercised that privilege but had reserved to themselves the autocratic right to select
their heirs from amongst their many male offspring.'58 This assertion was completely
unsupported by the evidence; Mnyaiza kaNdabuko—the 'father of the Zulus' (ie. the senior
member of the Zulu Royal House) and Tandayipi's supporter—denied that Zulu kings never
had chief wives, adding for good measure that it was never the first wife.59
The anthropologist Max Gluckman seemed to agree when he wrote of Zulu royal succession,
'The rule of succession is that the heir is born of the woman whom the chief makes his chief
wife.'60 The history of the kings themselves, however, points more to individual ability than
predestination. Senzangakhona's designated heir, Sigujana, railed to challenge Shaka when
he took the chieftaincy, although it is unclear whether his father, or other influential men,
suggested Shaka do so.61 Shaka's brothers and successors, Dingane and Mpande, seized the
throne by force, although later careful to employ legitimating devices.62 Mpande's heir
Cetshwayo was born of Mpande's chief wife and when the king began to favour Cetshwayo's
brother Mbuyazi (son of his most beloved wife), Cesthwayo defeated Mbuyazi and effectively
secured his own succession.63 Dinuzulu was chosen by Cetshwayo as his heir after a dream
in which he was told to select the fairest of his three sons; or, according to Gluckman,
Cetshwayo's chief wife had no children so he appointed Dinuzulu, although after
Cetshwayo's death a son was born to his chief wife whom the British made a chief.64
Even Solomon's succession had not been without controversy. Dinuzulu had died without
nominating an heir and it was left to his principal headman Mankulumana kaSomaphunga
Ndwandwe to consult with those who had been with Dinuzulu on his deathbed, his izinceku
or personal attendants, and announce that Dinuzulu had nominated his son David Nyawana.
This was confirmed with some 'leading men of the nation/ and announced to the gathering
at Dinuzulu's funeral who acclaimed their new king. Before the cheering died down,
dissenting voices could be heard from other 'prominent men' and a meeting of the royal
family and Dinuzulu's izinceku and izinduna was called for the next day at which
Mankulumana was roundly berated by Mnyaiza kaNdabuko for interfering in the affairs of
the royal family. It soon emerged that David was unpopular within the inner circle, the
majority of whom favoured his 'modest, sober and intelligent' brother Solomon. In the end
it fell to Harriette Colenso to settle the matter by disclosing that Solomon had given her a
letter from his father nominating Solomon as his heir. No letter, Cope notes, 'was ever
produced—at least not in public.'65 Chief wives, at any rate, were peripheral to the dispute.
This brief survey of royal succession, marked as it is by regicide, gives surprisingly little
weight to the camouflage of rules; only with the last two monarchs did the will of their
predecessor, however manufactured, emerge as the legitimating factor. Political support was
the acid test. 'In fact/ John Laband notes, 'no settled principle of royal succession would
ever become firmly established in the Zulu kingdom.'66 Even the Code could not hope to
capture family structure and succession practices. Not every kraal head, for example, created
an ikohlo as this house carried the danger that its heir might attract followers and pose a
threat to his half-brother. Trobably for this reason/ Jackson J surmised, 'the reigning kings
in Zululand appointed no Ikholo.'67 So too for this reason was the succession left unclear,
in order to minimise the threat from an heir apparent.
The ostensibly rigid succession rules in African society, John Comaroff has argued, were
actually surprisingly malleable. He observed how in Tswana society genealogical 'rules' of
succession were manipulated by contenders, producing a flexible system; one, he argued, that
was distorted by state intervention and the mechanistic application of succession 'rules.'68
The government ethnologist, Dr NJ van Warmelo, had perceived this at the time of the
dispute, when he warned against a legalistic approach to succession:
My contention is therefore that this picking of chiefs out of hat of chance will have to stop
unless the whole institution of chieftainship is to come to grief. The natives always thought
otherwise than to accept chiefs only on birth. In the olden days chiefs were men of birth plus
a certain amount of ability. The latter factor was determined often by strife, and this we
have to put an end to. But we cannot dispense with ability and I am certain that the
Government must sooner or later return to the old principle of birth plus ability, and take
responsibility for choosing the latter, and give the chiefs work to do in which the ability can
be seen by all.... General usefulness should be the test.69
Perhaps unable to dismiss the injunctions of the Code as to chief wives, or moved by the
weight of authority on this issue, the Board, having decided Zulu kings had no chief wives,
still made an attempt to rank Solomon's wives.
The learned members made a great play of the fact that Cyprian's mother Christina was a
'Sibiya' and that the mothers of the kings were always Sibiyas and that this fact had not been
contested.70 But if the rank of the wife was unimportant, why determine it? The Board was
clearly sensitive to allegations concerning the question of Christina's status as evinced by her
nuptial ceremonies. Christina, it appeared, had been married without any ceremony,
although there was no consensus as to whether lobolo had been paid.71 Although Christina
testified that Solomon had paid eleven head of cattle for her, she later claimed that only six
head of cattle had been paid and she had never considered herself married.72 A chief wife
who was not properly married was no chief wife at all—the question of Christina's wedding
was accordingly allowed to drop.
If the heir was appointed by virtue of his mother's status, as required by s 104(4) of the
Code, this was apparently done when Tandayipi's nomination was made, as members of the
family chose Tandayipi's mother, okaMbulawa, as Solomon's chief wife. This, at least, is
what Tandayipi argued in his petition to the Governor-General to be reinstated as Solomon's
heir, following the inquiry. Claiming that his mother had been ranked as chief wife in 1940
in terms of s 104(4) of the Code and that he had been recognised by the government as the
rightful heir, the Board therefore could not affect the ranking already conferred upon his
mother and his right, by virtue of that status, to succeed to the chieftainship. In addition,
Cyprian was the isokanqangi, the oldest son of the first wife who could never succeed his
father. Cyprian's appointment was thus 'wrong and contrary to the overwhelming weight
of Zulu tradition and customary law.'73
Sadly for Tandayipi, customary law, even codified, did not bind the Board as tightly as he
imagined. By some imaginative use of the concepts 'family' and 'tribe,' the Board argued
that at the 1940 meeting which nominated Tandayipi, 'the family was not fully
represented.'74
If the Board wished to establish a custom, they had to rely on the testimony of witnesses.
In South African law, evidence is permitted on the question of custom and foreign law.75
A similar rule was formulated in the Native High Court in the case of laduma v Bevu where
Campbell JP held, 'Expert evidence is allowable to describe a tribal custom or some local
usage, but not with respect to general native law.... Such evidence has been allowed with
regard to the general law in Zululand, and also upon some local custom, in the same way
as professional men and artizans may give evidence respecting the custom of their profession
or trade.'76 The interface between 'general native law' and 'local custom' was such that neat
distinctions were not always possible. Native law was an attempt to impose uniformity on
a diverse system, while retaining the possibility of local flexibility. The result, as the judges
were well aware, threatened to undermine the Code itself and, indeed, the whole operation
of native law.
Believing all witnesses to be partisan, the native courts developed a distaste for hearing
evidence on local customs. Natal sheriff Thomas Phipson wrote of African witnesses:
10
[Tlhey will say almost anything just to suit their present whim or purpose, thinking to
conciliate the magistrate, or to please their own chief or friends, or perhaps merely for
sport, just as it may happen. I do not mean to insinuate that they should be made
incapable of giving evidence; but assuredly judges, and magistrates, and juries, should
attach very little value to what they say, merely because they happen to say it.77
It was the contradictory testimony given by witnesses in Ntukwini v Miso which led the
irascible Judge Jackson to remark, "This... illustrates in a remarkable manner the little value
which can be placed on so-called expert evidence when the witnesses are either partisans of
one side or the other, or else have knowledge only of a local custom, which may exist only
in their own tribe/78
This scepticism was applied by the Board to Tandayipi's witnesses, who they found
unreliable and biased. It is trite to say that the same points concerning bias and vested
interest could have been made with regard to Cyprian's supporters.79 In the 'SM case'
Cohen and Odhiambo point to the issue of 'expertise and authority in the production of
knowledge/ or, the weight which is accorded to a witness' testimony.80 In the case at hand,
the participants thought age and status to be significant. Mshiyeni, for example, would not
answer questions on custom and succession, replying, 'Older men than I would be in a better
position to answer... I cannot answer for the rule of the Royal House. I am still young.'81
The Board however did not accept Mnyaiza's testimony, despite his age and status.82
The construction of authority is a complex process and it is dangerous to simply accept the
images conveyed by the witnesses without factoring in other considerations. Gender, for
example, allowed Cyprian's mother Christina to reconstitute herself as okaMatatela, a
traditionalist guise in which she went by the name of her father, and arguably had more
credibility than were she simply Christina Zulu. Even the question of 'chiefly authority' is
not cut and dried. Explaining who is considered an 'expert' in state commissions of inquiry,
Adam Ashforth writes, 'A "Chief, for example, speaking on matters of "tribal" administration
or "Native law and custom" is an authority, and one which the state, in this scheme, must
appear to listen to. The same person opining on the injustices of the Act of Union could be
adjudged a nuisance and thus ignored.'83 This account however ignores the wide discretion
on the part of the officials, and the different ways in which (and different purposes for
which) they heard African voices. Seemingly cloaked in authority, the chief would at times
turn out to be wearing nothing at all.
Litigants and witnesses alike attempted to root Cyprian's claim in custom, employing
different strategies in an attempt to maximise their chances of success.84 Although
'nominated by books/ Cyprian's claim was most enthusiastically pursued on the grounds
that he was 'marked' ie. circumcised. The 'mark' was thought to be significant in that it
related to a statement allegedly made by Solomon that his heir would bear a 'mark' and
Cyprian was the only circumcised son. This, certainly in the meetings of the royal family,
was Cyprian's primary claim, and some of the strongest testimony in favour of Cyprian at
the inquiry related to this aspect.85
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When, however, the evidence of the attending physician showed that Cyprian was
circumcised for medical reasons alone, the Board was forced to look to other issues. D.W.
Cohen has noted cases where the court 'chose not to recognize the essential, and
nonreciprocal, struggles constituted by each party to the litigation/86 Here, arguably, the
members of the Board had an intimate knowledge of, and a deep interest in, the dispute. Yet
they still chose what to hear, and what not; the voices which were heard most clearly, made
no sound at all.
Since the question of the chief wife was so problematic for Cyprian's cause, it was necessary
to locate his appointment in Solomon's intentions. With the significance of Cyprian's 'mark'
diminished, and the other indicators of Solomon's intentions weak, the prince's claim was
boosted by a spectacular development. Christina had produced a letter which she claimed
Solomon had given her sometime in 1930:
Although you disappointed me by deserting arid wandering over the country, that did not
remove from my heart the fact that you are - you ka Matatela - the one who was to bear the
chief.... I give this letter to you to keep it safely so that in case I should die before putting
my kraal in order, you should produce it so that it should be known that my 'inkosana'
(heir) is Cyprian Bekuzulu.87
Questions were raised about the authenticity of the letter, and of the two handwriting experts
consulted, only one would certify that it was genuine. Native Affairs head office was also
suspicious; it was up to the Board to placate their superiors in Pretoria.88 Assuming,
however, that the letter was genuine/ the evidentiary value ascribed thereto—'the fortuitous
circumstance that an old native woman managed to keep a scrap of paper intact for so many
years/ van Warmelo acerbically called it89—was out of all proportion to its 'actual' value
which was merely to indicate Solomon's state of mind in 1930. If he had appointed Christina
in 1930, as the letter indicated, such appointment would be invalid; as the Court held in Bevu
v Laduma, "There can be no clandestine appointment of chief wives among the natives.'90
If the letter really embodied Solomon's wishes, could that not be seen as a form of
testamentary succession? Under 'original Native law/ according to Stafford and Franklin,
testamentary succession was unknown.91 This was modified by s 108 of the Code which
permitted the disposal of personal and kraal property by will, but not house property.
General succession, by implication, could not be effected by will. Chadwick AJP in Ntukwini
v Miso held that 'the native in his raw state could not make a will in writing, though he
might, and often does when nearing his end, desire to favour one son to the prejudice of
another. Native Law as I understand it will not allow him to do so. Under Native Law
inheritance depends on the position and rank of a man derived from the position occupied
by his mother in his father's family or kraal.'92 This deprivation of a fundamental right
under our common law was necessary to preserve the structure of native family law. As
Bennett points out, 'by making a will, the testator may upset the entire customary-law system
of succession, especially the expectations of the intestate heirs.793 Aside from creating an
ikholo, which was a form of testament, the kraal head had a clear heir whom he could not
disinherit save by a formal procedure. Section 118 of the Code permitted disinherison for
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'gross misconduct' but only after an enquiry by the father's chief or, if a chief himself, the
Supreme Chief. The father was not permitted, after disposing of the heir, to substitute
anyone other than the next in line of succession.94 Such technicalities were never considered
by the Board.
The Board Reports
In their report to the Governor-General, the Board attempted to make the matter as clear as
possible. Tandayipi's claim was based on the status of his mother and alleged utterings of
his father. Both were rejected, mainly because the Board was unimpressed by Tandayipi's
claim and the manner in which the supporting evidence was tendered. Tandayipi thus dealt
with, Cyprian's claim rested on the status of his mother, okaMatatela (Christina) and his
father's alleged statements. The Board happily accepted the evidence tendered on these
accounts; ultimately, however, everything turned on the letter: 'Whatever doubts your Board
may have had in regard to the genuineness of Cyprian's claim, those doubts were dispelled
entirely by the [handwriting] expert evidence which, in our view, places the issue beyond
doubt. We are satisfied that the letter is... a genuine document and embodies therein his
wishes as regards his heir.'
What was raised by books was disposed of by them as well, as they were written, recovered
and tendered by Cyprian's faction in order to bolster his claim. But literacy, like codification,
is often seen in a negative light. Jeff Guy, for example, argues that,
The written word was part of conquest in South Africa... The document justified conquest,
the published proclamation established the right to rule, and the codification of native law
created the written precedent, removing customary law from its African custodians and
handing over the practice and the execution of the law to an ever-growing body of literate
professionals and state officials.95
But this obscures the flexibility of the apparently rigid. Firstly, Africans were able to function
within this 'literate' legal environment; secondly, Africans continued to contribute to the
development of native law through their oral testimony; and, thirdly, the 'body of literate
professionals and state officials' were neither as homogenous as this statement presupposes,
nor as bound by 'precedent.' James Clifford, in his study of the 'Mashpee case,' concluded
that '[T]he law reflects a logic of literacy, of the historical archive rather than of changing
collective memory.'96 The relationship between the 'archive' and 'changing collective
memory' is however rather more fluid. Cyprian's tactic of reverting to written evidence, was
successfully employed by at least one educated 'outsider' in a Zulu succession dispute in the
1930s.97 Words, whether oral or written, have no inherent value and are always available
for appropriation by interested parties.
Ultimately, it was left to the Board members to adopt their own strategies to achieve the
desired outcome. The Board, in a remarkable development, created the custom of the Zulu
kings. Where no rule had been followed, perhaps for fear of an impatient heir, the Board
drew forth a series of rules relating to the status of royal wives and the king's intentions.
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The 'untraditional' manner in which the issue had finally been resolved, led the chairman of
the Board, Colonel Martin, to refer to safer grounds in his unpublished memoirs, where he
explained the finding: 'The Board was satisfied that, with the exception of [Dingane and
Mpandel, Zulu kings had, from time immemorial, regarded their first wives as the mothers
of the Tribal heirs.'98 First wives became chief wives, in an belated attempt to fall within
the confines of the Code.
Behind all the twists and turns, the frantic search for custom, lay the fear of upheaval, rooted
in political conditions. Needing to maintain order, the tension between administration and
justice, as Chanock has made clear, was endemic to customary law in British colonial
Africa.99 The priorities of the administrators often meant that efficiency (and expediency)
outweighed the niceties of the English legal system.
In the Natal of the 1940s, a revived Natal African National Congress (after George Champion
defeated the moderate John Dube's chosen successor for President in 1945) threatened the
tranquillity of the world of the native administrators. Well known to the Natal NAD from
his involvement with the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) in that province,
Champion was also no stranger to Zulu politics, having tried to win the support of Solomon
for his cause.100
This threat from the left meant a strong 'traditionalist' counterweight was needed, but the
headstrong Mshiyeni was failing to perform. During his reign he had alienated many
prominent Zulu leaders, as well as Nongoma Native Commissioner Braatvedt. Autocratic,
with an explosive temper, the rancorous regent won few friends with his unwavering
support of unpopular government policies like cattle culling and the recruitment of African
servicemen. High-handed behaviour exacerbated the difficulties any regent was bound to
face.101 Politically isolated, Mshiyeni resigned soon after Cyprian's appointment as heir,
lamenting, 'My heart is now dead. I have no inclination for anything. The people are
making a football out of me.'102
Interesting in itself, Zulu politics (and the concomitant issues of who was supporting
Tandayipi and who Cyprian and why) is peripheral to this paper. What is important here,
as the Natal NAD recognised, is that Mshiyeni's unpopularity meant that his support for
Tandayipi made the young man an unlikely heir. Great things would be required of the new
incumbent, not least that he face Mqangabodwe's nightmares, George Champion and his
Congress followers.103 His colleagues on the Board shared a similar fear of the 'so called
Bantu Intelligentsia.'104 Given these imperatives, the men from Natal concluded their report
in the vein of true native administrators:
Your Board is fortified in its recommendation by the undoubted popularity of Cyprian with
the members of the Usutu tribe. Such popularity was plainly indicated throughout our
enquiry by the enthusiasm shown for his cause by the vast majority of the multitude which
assembled daily to listen to the evidence. We feel safe in estimating that fully 90% of the
people are his supporters. In such circumstances it would be futile, from an Administrative
point of view, to accept Tandayipi as the heir even if his claim to that position were
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substantiated, which is not the case.105
This outcome had been predicted by Braatvedt when the dispute had first surfaced. He had
confided to Colonel Martin, 'From what I can gather, Cyprian has numerous supporters
among the rank and file, and it is after all, the rank and file who will decide the issue for us
one day.'106 In Bevu v Laduma, the Court observed that the plaintiff had, over a few years,
become the more popular candidate, yet concluded, 'It is useless to trace the origin of this
revulsion of feeling; it lies outside the purview of a Court of Law, and does not affect the
principles by which a decision of the case should be governed.'107 Thus although of no
'legal' relevance, popular support proved decisive.
Such legal juggling was not uncommon to the practice of customary law which provided
great scope for creative agency.108 This has been noted by Terence Ranger who, in a recent
re-assessment of his work on 'invented tradition/ has called for a modification of both his
own and Chanock's views on customary law. Referring to the work of Sally Falk Moore
Ranger contends that the recognition of customary law 'does not mean, as I argued, the
ending of flexible custom and the introduction of a rigid code operating in the interests of
patriarchy. Rather it means the setting-apart of a sphere—restricted, tolerated—in which an
assumed static customary code in fact deals flexibly with matters below or beyond the concern
of the state/109
Even with codification (which constrained rulers and ruled), custom was not ossified. Thus
when Mann and Roberts write, 'The invention and eventual codification of custom solidified
fluid cultural and legal ideas and relationships into reproducible rules/ they fall into the trap
of which Ranger warns us: 'I think now that my argument was too polarised between what
I identified as 'admirable' flexible custom and what I defined as 'deplorable' invented
tradition. I associated all the positive forces in African societies with custom and all the
reactionary forces with tradition/110
Conclusion
Customary law provided a space for the contestants to manipulate their claims to gain the
maximum possible advantage. Deploying various strategies, literacy included, they
attempted to mould their cases within a particular discourse. Just as customary law was
created by interaction between Africans and Europeans, so Africans continued to represent
themselves in particular ways and influence the development of customary law.111
Judges too entered this arena, employing precedent, codified rules, oral testimony, personal
knowledge, prejudice and even whimsy to reach their decisions. Yet they always sat in the
shadow of Native Administration. Van Warmelo had dismissed the Board's seemingly-
legalistic finding arguing that he would 'on no account recognise Cyprian merely because
Solomon (who was a sad specimen of a chief himself) wrote a little note on a typewriter and
signed it.'112 He later added, 'This is a political problem, not a judicial tilt. Personalities
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and influence count for more than legal niceties. What would be the object of making
impeccable legal decisions if these involved political blunders? The Government cannot afford
them.'113 What the ethnologist missed was that a judicial tilt was being used to resolve a
political problem. When Lord Hailey reported on the African courts (in British Africa) that,
"'native custom" administered in the courts has ceased to be a matter of precedent and has
become just common sense/ it was with a great deal of concern for the future of native
administration.114 But common sense and precedent have always been members of the
same legal family; if anything they were closer relations in native law. In the hiatus between
written law and custom, native administrators wrought their own version of justice; poised
between their conceptions of African autocracy and fair play, they adjudicated, legislated and
generally intervened in local communities in ways that were designed more to keep the
peace, than to accord with the strictures of custom. But the arguments of the litigants, and
the verdicts of the judges, were always carefully draped with custom, cut from a cloth that
was neither entirely natural, nor wholly artificial.
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